What has happened since the Coup?
Six weeks after the July 26th coup, the return to power of the democratically elected Nigerien President, Mohamed Bazoum seems increasingly unlikely. Abdourahmane Tchiani, head of Niger’s presidential guard, named himself head of a transitional government. The 62-year-old general declared the intervention to be necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country.
For the Sahel, West Africa, and ECOWAS, Niger’s development in the coming months will also be crucial. The radical stance of the Niger junta has made it very difficult for ECOWAS to engage in dialogue. But it remains essential to avoid an external military intervention, the threat of which has generated an active military alliance from Mali and Burkina Faso and given the junta the opportunity to further mobilize the population by playing on patriotic sentiments.
France, Germany, Italy and the United States all have a military presence in Niger and will have to make some tough choices in the short term. Continued military presence will not be possible if a government hostile to them is installed in Niamey. But while France is directly implicated by the demonstrators supporting the coup, the United States—whose military presence and political influence have always been more discreet—has some room for manoeuvre in managing this period of uncertainty. Niger had been France’s most reliable ally in the region but the junta has since declared the end of defence agreements that authorised the presence of French soldiers on Nigerien soil. A forced withdrawal from Niger would further reduce France’s influence, leaving only Chad and the West African coastal states of Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and possibly Benin as host countries for a continued French presence.
The overthrow of Bazoum may also signal a shift in alliances toward Russia. Like many African countries, Niger also has a long history of cooperation with Russia and many of its military equipments are Russian-made. But Niger is not close to Moscow and voted for a UN resolution for the end of Russia’s use of force against Ukraine.
Niger has not escaped insurgent attacks by armed groups affiliated to ISIS and AQIM, but it has fared much better than its neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso. Insecurity is worst in the Tillabéry region in the West near the border with Mali, where armed jihadi groups operate relatively freely. However, the civilian Niger government had retained control of much of its territory.
Why is the west so interested?
While Niger’s economic and social indicators place it at the bottom of global development indices, these metrics also understate the country’s strategic importance of this vast country. Its geographical position at the crossroads of North, West, and Central Africa; its mineral and oil resources; its potential for the development of renewable energies; and its strong demographic growth help explain the seemingly outsize interest of medium and large powers in the current crisis.
Despite Tchiani’s reasoning on the need for the coup, Niger was on a promising economic path, with high economic growth rates from 2022. There were ambitious reform and investment plans in education, continued discoveries of increasingly large oil reserves and the expectation of the Kandadji dam and hydropower plant on the Niger River (by 2025) regenerating ecosystems and securing a national source of energy production (as 70 percent of Niger’s electricity was imported from Nigeria prior to the coup). Uranium has lost its importance as a capital earner since the expansion of oil processing and export. That positive future is now uncertain.
What next for ECOWAS?
During the past 6 weeks, various attempts to talk with the junta have resulted in stalemate. Over the same period, the junta have striven to leigitimse their interim administration, nominating a civilian, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, as the Prime Minister.
Despite the heftly sanctions imposed on Niger by ECOWAS, including the severing of the power supply, 70% of which was provided by Nigeria, Prime Minister Zeine assures the press that the Niger administration continue talks with ECOWAS and that he expects a positive outcome very soon.
The newly appointed ECOWAS Chair is the recently installed Nigerian President, BolaTinubu. Under his guidance, ECOWAS has also warned several times of intervening militarily to reinstate Bazoum, but only if peaceful attempts to resolve the crisis fail.
A key question in the crisis is a timeline for returning to civilian rule. ECOWAS has rejected the junta’s ambition for a three-year transition. As Nigerian President, Tinubu has suggested a nine-month transition back to civilian rule. Algeria, which also expresses a vested interest as a neighbouring country with economic ties, has suggested a six-month transition.
Should it come to a military intervention, Nigeria would be expected to provide the bulk of the military force and associated logistic support. President Tinubu has just completed his first 100 days in the job and finds himself embattled with very high inflation, increasing fuel prices (now subsidy free), a national currency in freefall against the dollar and an increasingly vocal and angry populace, suffering as a result. Whilst a military campaign might potentially assist in distracting the focus from domestic woes to uniting the country in a foreign enterprise, it is doubtful that Nigeria’s economy could bear the financial burden. As both the Nigerian president and as the ECOWAS Chair, Bola Tinubu needs to weigh up his options and tread carefully.
For ECOWAS, the challenge is to demonstrate political nerve in bolstering democracy. Before Niger, there were coups in Guinea, Burkina Fasso and Mali. Since the Niger coup, Gabon’s civilian government has also been replaced by a military junta. Cameroon is reported to have responded to this threatening trend by restructuring its military high command. The credibility and value of ECOWAS hangs in the balance.