Strategic Objectives in the Ukraine Counter-Offensive

Much of the Ukraine analysis in Western media has focused on the state of the counter-offensive. Specifically, analysts have focused on the tactical picture around Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Klishiivka in the Donetsk Oblast. Success in Robotyne and breaking through the Russian defensive lines opens the way to Tokmak. Capturing Tokmak would put much of the Russian road and rail routes to Crimea within range of Ukrainian artillery and MLRS systems. In a sense, Ukraine has the opportunity to cut the “land bridge” to Crimea without physically holding the ground. The arrival of the American ATACMS will be pivotal in this regard. Klishiivka on the other hand provides the high ground necessary to take and hold Bakhmut further north in the future. Again, the recent arrival of American cluster munitions are already said to be helping take a toll on Russian trench positions here. In re-capturing Bakhmut, Ukraine is able to demonstrate its will to fight to Western backers and deal a blow to morale to the Russian forces that spilt so much blood in taking it.

Ukraine's Resilience Amid Slow Progress

That we are talking about small, specific towns, and that we have been talking about the same small towns for weeks, indicates the slow progress of the counter-offensive. The Kharkiv counter-offensive in 2022 gained so much ground in so little time that analysis spoke of cities and oblasts, not villages and tree-lines. Analysis today is also right to note the time constraints on Ukrainian forces: the approaching autumn and the American elections next year. It is difficult to imagine large successes in the counter-offensive with the time available.

Here it is important to note the Ukrainian will to fight. Zelensky has repeatedly ruled out negotiations while Russian forces remain on Ukrainian territory and while Putin is in power, and this position appears resolute. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian population seems ready for the long-haul. There is an acceptance of the situation, and with little complaint, perseverance. It is visible day-to-day. Institutions are functioning, the trains run on time, business are open, people walk in the parks in the evenings and weekends. The sirens still sound but are tolerated, in much the same way that people came to tolerate coronavirus three years previously. People continue to talk of the pending victory and curse the Russians in the same breath. The calls for negotiations are from abroad, not from Ukraine.

The Challenge of Sustaining Ukraine's Counter-Offensive

And so the question is inevitably raised: can Ukraine succeed in its counter-offensive before Western support dwindles? What is missing from analysis, however, is not the tactical picture on the ground, nor the state of Western support. It is the political picture in Russia.

It is easy for us to watch a few battlefield videos or hear a few anecdotes about the poor state of the Russian army, and make the conclusion that Russia does not have the military prowess it claimed in the run-up to the invasion. But for all its tactical failures, Russia still has the vast materiel resources and manpower to continue fighting 18 months on against an opponent supported militarily, diplomatically and financially by most of the world’s largest economies. As this realisation dawns, along with the growing consensus that the war will continue for years rather than months, it is natural to worry that critical voices will grow louder, from Viktor Orban to Tucker Carlson.

Russia's Brittle Political Landscape and Growing Discontent: Insights and Implications

But while the Russian state may not be fragile, it is brittle. Some may point to the iron grip Putin appears to have over Russia’s institutions, politics and society and compare it to the comparative weakness of Western leaders. Britain went through three Prime Ministers in two months last year, for example, while Putin has been in power for over 20 years. But the reality is that the Russian political system has no room for flex. When change comes, it comes hard and fast, as seen multiple times over the last century plus. Where in the West, the party may change but the political mechanisms endure, in Russia the upheaval is full political revolution- the kind not seen in Britain since Oliver Cromwell. The Wagner debacle, while perhaps not the change we want, was a small glimpse at the kind of “black swan” event in the future that we cannot foresee today.

The Ukrainian criticism of the Russian citizenry is that they lack the initiative, conviction or motivation seen on Maidan in 2013-14. That is fair. State persecution of political opposition is harsh, but Russians who oppose the war have so far been more likely to take a flight to the Red Sea than organise an uprising on the Red Square.

Yet while it is hard to measure, discontent in Russia is rising. Younger citizens, particularly those with access to online media as opposed the state television, question where their country is headed, and why they are today politically closer to North Korea than Berlin or Paris. They are also not blind to the irony of “standing up to the West” but at the same time selling sovereignty in Siberia to China. Reminders of Russia’s isolation are everywhere: the loss of international clients in the lucrative IT sphere, the absence of Western high street brands, the loss of direct flights to Europe and new visa restrictions on Russian citizens. The list goes on. But while that may not be enough to spark a political upheaval, it certainly acts as a substantial supply of fuel once ignition is reached. That this “enlightened” liberal citizenry is located primarily in Moscow and St Petersburg will likely play its part.

Conclusion

So, while it is not wrong to put Ukraine’s counter-offensive against a Westen timetable of elections and changing seasons, it should not be done without considering the picture in Russia too. Discussion around whether Ukraine can indeed reach the Azov Sea militarily may turn out to be a moot point, should an upheaval in Russia precipitate. Analysis should therefore consider whether Western support can enable Ukraine to sustain itself long enough not to reach the American election, but to hold out for a Russian political collapse.